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Politics and Judgment
Suzanna Sherry
l
Two hundred years after its most famous invocation in Marbury v. Madi-
son,2 judicial review has apparently lost its luster. Despite its global spread, it is
in disrepute in its country of origin. The mainstream American academic atti-
tude toward judicial review as practiced by the modem Supreme Court ranges
from open hostility to a position similar to Winston Churchill's on democracy:
It is the worst way to implement a Constitution, except for all the rest.
In this essay, I want to explain the source of the hostility, defend judicial
review against its critics, and make a few suggestions for improvement.
First a word on what I mean by judicial review. In some versions, judi-
cial review describes only a limited power to interpret a constitution or other
guiding document, but no binding authority. In Canada and the United King-
dom, for example, the courts can declare a statute inconsistent with - respec-
tively - the Canadian Constitution or the European Convention on Human
Rights, but cannot enforce that declaration. The offending statute either re-
mains effective until repealed by the legislature or can be made effective by
re-enactment.
3
I will focus instead on the modem American form of judicial review, un-
der which judicial declarations interpreting the Constitution are binding on all
other governmental actors. The judiciary has the final word in the sense that if it
declares a statute unconstitutional, the statute is ineffective and unenforceable,
even if it remains on the books. We should note, of course, that the judiciary's
decision is not final if it decides that a particular course of action is consistent
with the Constitution. In that case, other governmental actors can still exercise
independent judgment and decline to follow the course of action if they believe
that it is unconstitutional or even simply unwise. To speak of judicial suprem-
acy then, is a bit misleading. The judiciary is no more supreme than any other
1. Cal Turner Professor of Law and Leadership, Vanderbilt University Law
School. This essay was originally presented as the Earl F. Nelson Memorial Lecture at
the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. Other than the addition of foot-
notes, it remains largely unchanged from the oral version. Portions of the essay draw
on a forthcoming book with Daniel Farber. © Suzanna Sherry and Daniel Farber.
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. See Can. Const. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms), § 33; Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); see also Jeffrey Golds-
worthy, Judicial Review, Legislative Override, and Democracy, 38 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 451 (2003).
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branch of government, but no action can be taken, no law enacted and enforced,
unless all three branches of government agree that it is constitutional.
Described in this innocuous way - that judicial review simply ensures
that no law is effective unless all three branches of government concur that it
is constitutional - judicial review should be uncontroversial. And, indeed,
until the past forty years or so, it was. Marbury itself was not novel, and gen-
erated virtually no opposition to its invocation of the Court's power to invali-
date congressional statutes.4 Eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Ameri-
cans mistrusted concentrations of power, and thus were unwilling to confer
on legislatures - including Congress - the final authority to judge the consti-
tutionality of the laws they enacted. Nor did the executive branch, which was
even more distrusted because of the American rejection of monarchy, offer a
viable alternative as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution.6 Judicial review
was therefore the obvious way to keep the legislature and the executive from
exceeding their constitutionally delineated powers.
Historically, the larger battle over judicial review was a debate about
federalism rather than about separation of powers. Judicial invalidation of
federal statutes was one thing; federal judicial invalidation of state statutes
was quite another. But this was not really a dispute about the power of the
judiciary, but instead about the power of the federal government in general.
Few objected to state courts invalidating state statutes that were inconsistent
with state constitutions.7 And federal legislative power was every bit as con-
troversial as federal judicial power.8 So nineteenth-century disputes about
judicial review were very different from today's disputes.
In this nineteenth-century battle between the states and the federal gov-
ernment, especially the judiciary, the states never really had a chance. What
4. See, e.g., 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 248 (1923); ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 102 (1989); CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 58-64 (1996); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders'
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987).
5. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 291 (1985); Daniel A. Farber, Judicial
Review and Its Alternatives: An American Tale, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 415, 442-
44 (2003); FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
6. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 5, at 86.
7. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 4; cf JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 173-74 (1996) (founders
wanted state courts to invalidate state statutes that were inconsistent with Federal
Constitution).
8. For some controversies about the reach of federal power, see McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824), and the state responses to the federal Alien and Sedition Acts. For accounts of
the latter dispute, see, for example, MURRAY DRY, CIVIL PEACE AND THE QUEST FOR
TRUTH 65-69 (2004); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIc MCKITRCK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM
719-20 (1993).
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the states were demanding - in cases like Martin v. Hunter's Lessee9 and
McCulloch v. Maryland ° - was essentially a system of polycentric constitu-
tionalism. In other words, let the Supreme Court be the judge of the constitu-
tionality of federal statutes or executive decisions, but let the states them-
selves have the final word on the constitutionality of state conduct.
That sort of polycentric constitutional interpretation was doomed to fail-
ure for two reasons. First, while multiple interpretations with no authoritative
final arbiter are possible, such interpretations carry an unacceptably high risk
of instability. Indeed, the American Civil War can be viewed partly as an
illustration of the consequences of a failure to agree on an authoritative arbi-
ter. Thus, polycentric interpretation is not an attractive option in the abstract.
The inevitable instability of multiple interpretations was exacerbated in
the early United States by the nature of the fundamental underlying dis-
agreement between the states and the federal judiciary, especially as repre-
sented by John Marshall. That disagreement was essentially over whether the
United States was a nation or a confederation of states, and was encapsulated
in a linguistic dispute. Unimaginable as it is today, eighteenth- and nine-
teenth-century Americans argued about the appropriate verb to be used for
the United States: the United States is or the United States are?" While the
modem concern about judicial review stems largely from its countermajori-
tarian aspects, the antebellum dispute about judicial review was less about
democracy than about nationhood. That question was ultimately resolved not
in a courthouse, but on the courthouse steps at Appomattox.
Viewed in this light, judicial review seems both inevitable and benefi-
cial. It serves as a check on Congress and the president, ensures that states
adhere to the Federal Constitution, and reduces the potential for political in-
stability and internecine warfare by providing a final, authoritative source of
constitutional interpretation.
So why is it under attack?
I believe the current hostility to judicial review stems from a misconcep-
tion about what judges actually do - and should do - in constitutional cases.
More and more, the conventional wisdom seems to be that constitutional ad-
judication is simply politics by another name. And politics, the thinking goes,
should be the province of the people and the legislature, not of unelected fed-
eral judges with life tenure.
In this essay, I argue that conflating law and politics, as the critics do, is
not only the wrong way to think about what judges do - it is also dangerous.
To the extent that the misconception seeps into public and political con-
9. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316.
11. See, e.g., JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND
AMERICAN REVOLUTION viii (1991); John Randolph Prince, Forgetting the Lyrics and
Changing the Tune: The Eleventh Amendment and Textual Infidelity, 104 DICK. L.
REV. 1, 16 n.65 (1999). For a general overview of the debate about nationhood, see
RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 161-202.
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sciousness, it invidiously begins to influence judges and thus becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. The judiciary is not yet fully politicized, but the process
seems to have started.
Evidence of the contemporary equating of judging and politics comes in
many forms. The evidence most familiar to law students and faculty is proba-
bly the academic literature. Political scientists have argued for years that judi-
cial decisions are determined primarily by the judge's politics. 2 Law profes-
sors used to take issue with that claim, but many have lately been explicitly or
implicitly accepting it.
In this context, consider the "countermajoritarian dilemma." The term
was coined by Alexander Bickel in the 1960s to describe the tension that ex-
ists when unelected judges can declare invalid acts of the popularly elected
branches.' 3 For Bickel, the resolution of the dilemma lay in the recognition
that judges and legislatures perform different functions - in other words, that
judging was not simply politics.
More recently, however, prominent constitutional scholars have ap-
pealed to the countermajoritarian nature of judicial review to criticize both
judicial review and the Supreme Court. They suggest that in striking down
state and federal statutes, the courts are usurping the rights of the people and
their elected representatives to interpret the Constitution. Instead of an "activ-
ist" or "arrogant" Supreme Court, these scholars urge, we should have "popu-
lar constitutionalism." This popular constitutionalism comes in many flavors,
from mild exhortations, to proposals for reining in judicial discretion, to ar-
guments that the states and the other branches of the federal government may
ignore the Supreme Court's decisions.' 4 All are based on the theory that judi-
cial review, at least as currently practiced by American courts - especially the
Supreme Court - is anti-democratic and therefore inconsistent with the
American constitutional regime.
Let us leave to one side the fact that the Constitution does not, and was
not designed to, create a pure democracy. Also put aside the critics' exaggera-
tion of both the representativeness and accountability of the elected branches
and the countermajoritarian nature of the judiciary. Instead, let us consider a
premise that is implicit in both the countermajoritarian critique of judicial
12. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL AND HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
13. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
14. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE THE
PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994); JEREMY WALDRON,
THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999); Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudi-
cial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359 (1997); John
Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Consti-
tution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371 (1988); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
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review and the calls for popular constitutionalism: that the Court's constitu-
tional decisions - like legislative enactments - are political acts and should
therefore reflect the political wishes of the majority.
This implicit premise becomes clearer if we contrast the criticisms of the
judiciary's constitutional decision-making with the attitude towards its non-
constitutional decisions. No one complains that judges are acting contrary to
the wishes of the people when they rule on legal questions, such as whether
testimony is admissible, or whether it is an antitrust violation for a company
to conspire with its officers, or when common law preclusion doctrines bar a
subsequent suit, or how the burdens of production are allocated in an em-
ployment discrimination case. Those are legal questions, and we leave them
to legal experts - to judges, in other words. Congress may set the framework
by enacting legislation, but we instinctively separate that initial political deci-
sion from the myriad legal decisions that must be made in the course of im-
plementing the legislation.
Contemporary critics of judicial review, however, view constitutional
questions not as legal questions but as political ones. They think that the
courts are doing something different - and suspect - when they interpret the
Constitution than when they interpret a statute or a common law precedent or
a rule of civil procedure.
This widely-held implicit belief that constitutional law is not really law
at all, but politics, is also becoming more explicit in the work of some consti-
tutional scholars. Recent articles claim that it is not possible to separate con-
stitutional law from politics, or that Supreme Court decisions - whether for
good or ill - simply mirror popular opinion.' 5 Two respected law professors
are circulating a proposal for what amounts to term limits for Supreme Court
Justices, and they have the support of over a dozen prominent liberal and
conservative legal scholars.' 6 What all these arguments and proposals have in
common is the rejection of any distinction between what judges do in consti-
tutional cases and what legislatures do generally.
To be fair, this conflating of law and politics is not all the fault of aca-
demics. The judicial appointment process is now based almost entirely on the
assumption that a nominee's political views matter more than his or her legal
acuity or judicial temperament.
This emphasis on political views has not always existed. Until the late
1980s or so, lawyers were nominated to the federal bench - including the
Supreme Court - because they were prominent and respected, as well as usu-
ally being stalwart members of the president's party. But party affiliation is
15. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Better Lucky Than Good, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 33 (2004);
Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347 (2003); Barry
Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial
Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1282-84 (2004); Robert Post, Foreword: Fashion-
ing the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003).
16. See Linda Greenhouse, How Long Is Too Long for the Court's Justices?,
N.Y. TIMES, January 16, 2005, § 4, at 5.
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not the same as political ideology; in the past, moderate members of the presi-
dent's party were more likely to be respected by the bench and bar - and
therefore more likely to be nominated and confirmed - than were those on the
left or right fringes of the party.
Justice Blackmun, for example, made a name for himself by quietly
practicing law for sixteen years before he was nominated to the Eighth Circuit
by President Eisenhower.' 7 Justice Blackmun was a moderate Republican
who had supported Democrat Hubert Humphrey's Senate campaign. In his
eleven years on the Court of Appeals, Justice Blackmun earned a reputation
as a careful, hardworking, and moderate judge. His Court of Appeals opinions
are not particularly ideological, and his nomination to the Supreme Court was
probably prompted as much by his longstanding friendship with Chief Justice
Warren Burger as by his obvious competence.1
8
Another example of how the nomination process used to work is the
federal district judge whose open and repeated downward departures from the
federal Sentencing Guidelines in some types of drug cases led to a congres-
sional investigation, Republican lambasting of soft-on-crime judges, and
eventually a statute limiting judges' authority to depart downward.19 How did
this obviously partisan judge get to the bench? He was a respected local law-
yer who managed the election campaign of a successful congressional candi-
date, which led to his appointment as U.S. Attorney, which in turn led to his
nomination to the federal bench. And before you jump to any conclusions: the
congressional candidate was a Republican, and the supposedly soft-on-crime
judge in question was appointed to both the U.S. Attorney position and the
federal judgeship by President Ronald Reagan. 20
Changes in the appointments process have virtually put an end to stories
like these. From among the many qualified candidates for the federal bench
who also happen to be members of the president's party, presidents now tend to
nominate not the most respected but the most rabidly ideological. The Senate,
which used to go along with all but the least qualified or most controversial
nominees, now responds with ideological fervor of its own. Sometimes this
17. These biographical details about Justice Blackmun may be found in a num-
ber of sources, including TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 388-91 (2001), and Duane Benton & Barrett J. Vahle,
The Burger-Blackmun Relationship: Lessons for Collegiality from the Blackmun
Papers, 70 Mo. L. REv. 995 (2005).
18. HALL, supra note 17, at 388-91.
19. This statute limiting judicial departure from federal Sentencing Guidelines
was recently overturned by the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.
738 (2005).
20. The Sentencing Guidelines statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000 & Supp.
2004). For further information on the rest of this paragraph, see Rob Hotakainen &
Pam Louwagie, State's Chief U.S. Judge Might Face Subpoena, STAR TRIB., March
13, 2003, at IA; Edward Walsh & Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Orders Tally of Lighter Sen-
tences, WASH. POST, August 7, 2003, at Al.
(Vol. 70
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leads to the nomination of a "stealth" candidate, who has said and done nothing
of note, and sometimes it means instead a nasty public confirmation fight,
which convinces even more people that law and politics are equivalent. Mean-
while, the elevation of ideology over competence makes the federal bench itself
more political: as the opposition party picks its battles, concentrating on the
Supreme Court and a few high-profile lower court nominees, it necessarily
allows confirmation of most of the president's ideological choices.
All of these factors have an insidious effect on how the public views the
judiciary. So now we see such anomalies as an opinion poll asking the public
whom they think should be the next Chief Justice of the United States.21 Such
a poll is analogous to taking an opinion poll on whether the president needs
surgery or the Fed should raise interest rates. Members of the general public
simply do not have enough legal expertise to have an informed opinion, any
more than they know enough about medicine or economics to respond to
these hypothetical polls. Incidentally, the poll results at least partially bear
this out: although Justice O'Connor (who had not yet announced her resigna-
tion) was the top pick - a reasonable if not particularly imaginative choice -
former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani came in second. It is difficult to
see how any member of the public knows whether Giuliani is a good lawyer
or would be a good judge. But the public apparently likes his politics, and if
Supreme Court Justices are simply legislators in black robes the average citi-
zen has as much relevant knowledge as anybody else.
Finally, the Supreme Court is not helping matters. As I will explain in a
moment, I believe that most judges, including Supreme Court Justices, do
separate law and politics, at least most of the time. But sometimes they do a
poor job of explaining the difference. Cases like Bush v. Gore22 and Grutter
v. Bollinger23 mangle precedent so badly that it is unsurprising that both the
public and academic observers accuse the Court of playing politics with the
Constitution.
By now, I am sure that most of you are thinking that I must be the most
naive law professor on the planet. How can I possibly believe that constitu-
tional interpretation is anything other than a political act? Didn't the Legal
Realists teach us anything? The short answers are: No, I am not naive; yes,
constitutional interpretation is vulnerable to political hijacking but it need not
be; and yes, the Legal Realists taught us to be cautious. The longer answers
will take some time.
If constitutional law is not politics, what is it? It is, like the rest of law,
an exercise in judgment. That is, after all, why we call them judges. Few dif-
ficult or controversial legal questions have a single obviously right answer,
21. See Zogby International, O'Connor Top Choice for Chief Justice; Guiliani
Second Overall; Thomas Top Pick on Right, New Zogby Poll Reveals, available at
http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=955 (last visited Nov. 8, 2005)
(poll released January 26, 2005).
22. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
23. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2005]
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and it is the job of the judge to choose from among the plausible right an-
swers the one that seems best in the circumstances. If we step back from the
current belief that constitutional law is merely politics in disguise, we might
see that our entire legal culture - including the institutional structure of the
judiciary - encourages judges to set aside their personal politics and exercise
this sort ofjudgment.
We might begin with a query about the centuries-old tradition of com-
mon law judging, which provides the framework for all of American law.
Judges have even more discretion in common law cases than in constitutional
cases because there is not even a textual starting place. What keeps them from
simply enacting their own politics in those cases? The answer is that con-
straints are built into most judges' deeply internalized views of their role. The
key constraints in this context are fidelity to the rule of law and a preference
for incremental rather than radical change, and both constraints serve the
same function in constitutional cases as they do in common law cases.
The rule of law demands that judges decide cases on the basis of gener-
alizable principles rather than particularized results, take into account existing
principles (otherwise known as precedent) and give reasons - in the form of
opinions - for their decisions.
These concepts are so ingrained in our legal culture that we teach them
to beginning law students. For much of the first year of law school, we im-
merse students in judicial opinions to help them learn to extract principles and
apply precedent. We teach them to make arguments on both sides of an issue
to help them separate principled legal argument from politics or personal
preference. When law students become lawyers, this separation is reinforced
by the need to represent clients whose interests may not align with the law-
yers' personal beliefs.
When lawyers become judges, the pressure to remain faithful to the rule
of law becomes stronger still. There are rules designed to ensure impartiality
and to limit the role of the judge, and rituals that impress upon judges the
seriousness of their responsibilities. The adversary system attempts to provide
judges with the best information and the best arguments on both sides. In all
but the easiest cases, judges write opinions, exposing their reasoning about
principle and precedent to public scrutiny and criticism. In addition, the act of
writing an opinion forces a judge to measure her decision against the de-
mands of precedent and principle. A judge might reach a preliminary conclu-
sion, only to find that the opinion "won't write." 24 According to Justice
Blackmun's papers, Justice Kennedy switched his vote - and thereby changed
24. See, e.g., Paul A. Freund, An Analysis of Judicial Reasoning, in LAW AND
PHIL. 282, 288 (Sidney Hook ed., 1984); Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on
the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 211, 218 (1957). My own
conversations with judges confirm that this phenomenon continues today.
[Vol. 70
HeinOnline  -- 70 Mo. L. Rev. 980 2005
POLITICS AND JUDGMENT
the outcome - in an important Establishment Clause case because his original
draft opinion "looked quite wrong."
25
Another, less-noticed, constraint on judges' decision-making lies in the
fact that the American judicial system is both collegial and hierarchical. Appel-
late judges always sit on panels, and are almost always subject to review by a
higher court. This means that judges - who are appointed at different times by
different presidents with different political views - must base their decisions on
something other than idiosyncratic preferences. The only commonality is
judges' mutual faith in the rule of law and their sworn oath to uphold it. The
rule of law must be strong enough to hold a collegial court together.
The collegial nature of the American judiciary means that judges almost
always deliberate with other judges before issuing a decision. Deliberation
has a number of beneficial effects in cases in which the right answer is not
obvious - the kind of cases in which we most fear that politics plays a large
role. The range of views among judges helps to ensure that different view-
points are aired, and that poor or extra-legal arguments are identified. Depar-
tures from precedent and weak reasoning are similarly subject to expert scru-
tiny from other judges. If a colleague points out a flaw in one's reasoning, it
is (or should be) more difficult to remain wedded to that reasoning. All law,
even constitutional law, is a group project.26
Deliberation also means that judges have an opportunity to think
through their conclusions, with the help of their colleagues, before their views
are made public. As Justice Souter remarked during his confirmation hear-
ings, in explaining his refusal to express any opinion on matters that might
come before the Court, "it is much easier to modify an opinion if one has not
already stated it convincingly to someone else."27 It is even harder to modify
a view that has been formalized into a written public document. The delibera-
tion that takes place among judges before an opinion is issued tempers a
judge's views when they are most susceptible to alteration. Moreover, both
the act of attempting to persuade and the receipt of a colleague's views serve
to clarify disagreements, narrow disputes, and sharpen and strengthen the
legal basis for the decision.
25. See Linda Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution of a Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at Al (discussing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), which
held clergy-led prayers at public school graduations unconstitutional). For other ex-
amples of judicial mind-changing, see Tony Mauro, Lifting the Veil: Justice Black-
mun's Papers and the Public Perception of the Supreme Court, 70 Mo. L. REV. 1037
(2005), and Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of
Judicial Preference Change, 70 Mo. L. REV. 1209 (2005).
26. Professor Kobylka makes this point eloquently. Joseph F. Kobylka, Tales
from the Blackmun Papers: A Fuller Appreciation of Harry Blackmun 's Judicial
Legacy, 70 Mo. L. REV. 1075 (2005).
27. Confirmation Hearings of Judge David Souter to the Supreme Court Before
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong. J-101-95 at 194 (1990).
2005]
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Thus a judge, in deliberation with colleagues, may find that her initial
instincts are inconsistent with the rule of law and change her mind. And it is
this willingness to change one's mind that is the hallmark of a judge who has
the courage to risk being wrong and the humility to admit it - in other words,
a judge engaged in an exercise of judgment. Justice Blackmun was such a
judge, famously willing to change his mind. He changed his mind about the
breadth of congressional power, writing the majority opinion in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority28 and overruling a case in which he
had been in the majority nine years before. 29 And toward the end of his tenure
on the Court, he changed his mind about the death penalty. Having previously
supported it, he wrote in 1994 that he felt "morally and intellectually obli-
gated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. ' 30 His
judgment, informed by deliberations with his colleagues, the path of prece-
dent, and the unfolding history of the death penalty, had changed.
It took years for Justice Blackmun to change his views on federalism
and on the death penalty, as well it should. For in addition to fidelity to the
rule of law, our legal system encourages in judges a preference for incremen-
talism rather than sudden change. Again, it begins with law school: we bury
students in the common law, with its slow and incremental development.
Once out of law school, lawyers who want to change the law nevertheless
keep their arguments within stretching distance of prior precedent; arguing
for the overruling of precedent is a last, rather than a first, line of attack.
And again, judges, having lived in the law long enough to absorb this
preference for incrementalism, are further encouraged in their caution by the
judicial role. The judiciary is, by nature and by design, the most conservative
part of the government. The judiciary's task is to look back on past traditions
and simultaneously preserve them and change them to meet the challenges of
the present and future. Radical or revolutionary reform is inconsistent with
this role. In both common law and constitutional adjudication, incrementalism
and adherence to precedent work hand-in-hand to ensure that the law will
change slowly, through accretion and subtle revision rather than through sud-
den or fundamental shifts in policy. Judgment has more influence than politics.
The most famous example of constitutional incrementalism is the story
of Brown v. Board of Education,31 the case that held racially segregated
schools unconstitutional. The Court acted gradually - some would say too
gradually - both in declaring segregation unconstitutional and in implement-
ing its decision. For almost two decades before Brown, the Court gradually
eroded the prevailing doctrine that permitted "separate but equal" schools. In
a series of cases largely orchestrated by NAACP attorneys (including Thur-
good Marshall, later appointed to the Court by President Lyndon Johnson),
28. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
29. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
30. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1].
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the Court found various segregated educational facilities to be unequal and
therefore unconstitutional.3 2 The incremental nature of the change is illustrated
by the fact that the Court (helped along by the attorneys' choice of cases) began
with the most egregious inequalities and the least sensitive education settings -
graduate and professional schools rather than elementary schools. By 1954,
when the Court in Brown finally declared that even "equal" segregated schools,
at the elementary and high school level, violated the Constitution, much of the
nation was ready to accept the decision as the next step.
33
The Brown Court further diluted the radicalism of its holding by signal-
ing a willingness to tolerate delay in implementing it. The original decision
contained no order to take any particular action, instead requiring the parties
to reargue the question of appropriate remedies. 34 A year later, the Court or-
dered that schools be desegregated "with all deliberate speed."35 Although the
Court's cautiousness unfortunately encouraged the segregated states to defy
the Court, it is not clear whether a more immediate remedial order would
have been any more effective; there was not much progress until Congress
and the president, in addition to the Court, supported integration. In the mean-
time, however, the Court quietly went about ordering the desegregation of
other public facilities, slowly changing the nation's views on race and per-
haps leading the popular branches to their more enlightened views.
36
Brown is instructive on several levels. First, despite southern opposition
to integration, the Court's incremental approach had its advantages. In 1938,
when the Court first found unequal education facilities unconstitutional,3 7
most citizens were unprepared to accept integration. Had the Supreme Court
tried to outlaw segregation in 1938, the decision would have been met with
massive resistance - and not only in the south. Most northern cities were resi-
dentially segregated as well. A 1939 poll found that only 19% of those polled
in New England and the middle Atlantic states, and 12% of those in the mid-
west, agreed that blacks should be "allowed to live wherever they want to
live." 38 As late as 1952, 56% of whites polled in Detroit advocated residential
32. E.g., McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950)
(segregated graduate school unconstitutional); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)
(segregated law school unconstitutional); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337 (1938).
33. For the history of Brown, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
34. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
35. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (hereinafter Brown I1).
36. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958) (mem.) (per curiam) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (mem.)
(per curiam) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (mem.) (per curiam)
(golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (mem.) (per
curiam) (beaches).
37. See Gaines, 305 U.S. 337.
38. Eugene L. Horowitz, "Race" Attitudes, in CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
AMERICAN NEGRO 203-04 (Otto Klineberg ed., 1944).
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segregation. 39 As blacks began to move into previously white, working-class
neighborhoods in the 1940s and 1950s, there were racially motivated attacks
and even race riots in Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, Newark, and Cincin-
nati. 40 Although northern schools were not segregated by law, these residen-
tial patterns ensured that blacks and whites rarely went to the same schools.
41
In both the north and the south, many workplaces and occupations were seg-
regated 2 The armed forces remained segregated until 1949; all professional
sports were segregated until the mid-1940s.43 Attitudes changed slowly, but
they did change. President Truman integrated the armed forces in 1949; the
first federal voting rights act was passed in 1957. While I am not suggesting
that the Court should take full credit for the changing attitudes, I do believe
both that it had some influence and that any attempt at radical reform by the
Court would have been a dismal failure.
The history of the Court's decades-long struggle with segregated
schools also illustrates how the combination of adherence to precedent and a
preference for incremental change serves to constrain judges. We see with
hindsight that immediate integration - both before and after Brown - was a
political impossibility. But that fact alone could not have stopped a deter-
mined, independent, unelected Court from imposing its will, had it been so
inclined. That the Court was not so inclined is a testament to the inherently
conservative and non-political nature of constitutional adjudication. Even
judges who might have wished to proceed more quickly did not do so, re-
strained by a judicial temperament and incrementalist colleagues.
Finally, Brown teaches us that incrementalism has its costs: segregation
remained in place much longer than it should have. Painful as that cost may
be, it is also reassuring. The willingness to incur real costs demonstrates the
effectiveness of the constraints on discretion. A constraint that never hurts is
a constraint without bite.
I began this essay by pointing out some disturbing signs that more and
more Americans, lawyers and non-lawyers alike, believe that constitutional law
is nothing more than politics. I hope I have at least begun to convince you that
judges should, and usually do, decide even the most controversial constitutional
cases on the basis of judgment rather than politics. If the contrary belief is not
to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, however, there is much more to do. A few
institutional changes might help keep judgment above politics.
39. Thomas J. Sugrue, Crabgrass-Roots Politics: Race, Rights, and the Reaction
against Liberalism in the Urban North, 1940-1964, 82 J. AM. HIST. 551, 556 (1995).
40. Id. at 553; see also ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE
AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-1960 (1983).
41. See, e.g., Will Maslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6 VILL. L. REV.
353 (1961).
42. See, e.g., William A. Sundstrom, The Color Line: Racial Norms and Dis-
crimination in Urban Labor Markets, 1910-1950, 54 J. ECON. HIST. 382 (1994).
43. See, e.g., STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN
BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 94 (1997).
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First, we have to stop putting legal academics on the federal bench - by
and large they make terrible judges. Unlike the practice of law, a life spent in
academia provides all the wrong incentives for developing good judgment.
Academia actively discourages incrementalism: novelty is rewarded much
more than judgment or common sense.44 The more radical the idea the more
likely the work is to be published by top law reviews, cited by other scholars,
and quoted by the media. The most judicious work, which builds on what
went before and contributes only marginally new ideas, is considered pedes-
trian. Unlike legal work in practice, academic work is also a solo project, not
a group project. And academia further discourages the development of judg-
ment by insulating professors from challenge. Law professors are talkers, not
listeners.45 Most intellectual exchanges are abstract and sterile, conducted on
stylized panels or in the pages of law reviews. It becomes too easy not to
listen, and to dismiss one's critics as simply mistaken. Lawyers who cannot
listen or learn from criticism, on the other hand, will not be very successful.
So lawyers usually make much better judges than academics do, because they
are forced to engage and cooperate with their colleagues and because they
have learned to temper brilliance with judgment.
Second, we must encourage good habits and good character in judges.
Focusing on judicial character at the nomination stage would be a start. Con-
sider the advice of former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee deliberating on the nomination of Robert Bork to the
United States Supreme Court:
Were I in your position.., the central question I would be asking
is this. Is Judge Bork a man of judgment? Not intellect, not reason-
ing, not lawyering skills, not ideology, not philosophy - simply,
judgment. Is he a wise person? 46
And Katzenbach's remarks are equally applicable to a president thinking
about nominating a particular individual to the bench. Look for those who
have exhibited good judgment - which, incidentally, is likely to exclude both
44. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367
(1987); Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986);
Ward Farnsworth, Talking Out of School: Notes on the Transmission of Intellectual
Capital from the Legal Academy to Public Tribunals, 81 B.U. L. REV. 13 (2001);
Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Half: The Problem With Novelty in Constitutional
Law, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 921 (2001). The incompatibility between an academic career
and a judicial temperament is a recent development; academics used to make good
judges. See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED
JUSTICES 69-70 (1978).
45. See Lawrence S. Wrightsman & Justin R. La Mort, Why Do Supreme Court
Justices Succeed or Fail? Harry Blackmun as an Example, 70 Mo. L. REV. 1261 (2005).
46. Anthony Lewis, Abroad At Home: Question of Judgment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1987, at D23.
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high-profile individuals who have spent their careers "running" for the Su-
preme Court, and, as suggested earlier, law professors. I am suggesting in-
stead a different sort of "stealth" candidate: one the public may never have
heard of, but who has an available track record of good lawyering and good
judgment.
A variety of structural changes might also encourage judges to rely more
on judgment and less on politics. The gradual turn toward politics in constitu-
tional law - which is much slower and less pronounced among judges than
among politicians, but still worrisome - has coincided with three changes in
Supreme Court procedures. First, the Court's mandatory jurisdiction has all
but disappeared, leaving the Court with almost complete control over its
docket. Second, eight out of the nine Justices are now in a "cert. pool," so that
law clerks - fresh out of a prestigious law school and usually most interested
in hot constitutional topics - have greater influence on the choice of cases
heard by the Court. Third, over the past several decades the Supreme Court
has been deciding fewer and fewer cases, down from about 150 a year in the
1970s to about 80 a year since the mid-1990s. 47 One consequence of these
developments is that it makes it more likely that the Court's docket will in-
clude a larger percentage of major constitutional controversies. This in turn
can encourage Justices - unlike lower court judges, who see a full range of
legal questions - to view themselves as specialized constitutional arbiters
rather than as experts on legal questions. Such an attitude could infect their
decision-making process, skewing it towards politics and away from judgment.
Two possible responses might help mitigate this tendency toward consti-
tutional specialization by exposing Justices to more run-of-the mill - even if
difficult - legal questions. Both are a return to previous procedural devices.
Congress might re-enact earlier jurisdictional rules and enlarge the Court's
mandatory jurisdiction, taking away some of its ability to control its own
docket. Require the Court to hear any question of federal law on which there
is an identified circuit split, for example. Instead or in addition, Congress
might reinstate a practice that was abolished in the late nineteenth century:
circuit-riding. Justices used to travel around the country sitting with district or
appellate court judges, deciding whatever cases came before them. Having a
"circuit Justice" - who rules on requests for emergency stays and the like - is
a remnant of this practice. 48 During the nineteenth century, circuit-riding was
an arduous job, detested by Justices, largely because of the difficulties in-
volved in travel. It would be much easier today, and it might be enlightening
for the Justices to see more ordinary legal cases on a regular basis.
In making these suggestions, I do not mean to diminish the importance
of those within and closely related to the legal profession in assisting with
47. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 224-25 (3d ed. 2003).
48. Justice Blackmun was for a long time the Justice for the Eighth Circuit; it is
now Justice Thomas.
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maintaining the separation of law and politics. As law students, lawyers, legal
academics, and journalists, we should be careful in both our description and
our criticism of court decisions. Rather than labeling a decision we dislike as
"political" or "activist" or "legislative" or "autocratic," we should explain
why it is bad law. Nor should we spare decisions whose outcomes we agree
with. Instead, we should point out poor reasoning or other abuses wherever
we find them. It is all too easy to fall into the trap of applauding or deploring
a decision based on its outcome rather than its legal analysis, but as experts in
the law we have an obligation to avoid perpetuating the popular myth that law
and politics are equivalent.
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